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Abstract: Over the past few years, the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters has 
deeply influenced criminal law. The United Nations, the Council of Europe and the 
European Union have called upon States to criminalise certain conducts linked to the 
behaviour of these criminals, such as travelling abroad for terrorist purposes. These 
measures have been considered by many as an unjustified restriction on the free 
movement of persons guaranteed by several human rights instruments. Taking into 
account that the development of EU criminal law is based on the assumption that every 
member State has an adequate system of protection of fundamental rights, this criticism 
cannot be ignored. In this sense, an analysis of relevant case law on the restrictions of 
freedom of movement is highly useful to understand the position of the judiciary on the 
matter, and to identify possible difficulties in implementing these restrictions of free 
movement in national systems. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Shortly after the Paris attacks of November 2015, the international community began to 
accept the need to review criminal law instruments to address the phenomenon of 
foreign terrorist fighters. Resolution 2178 of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) was the first international step in this direction. The Resolution compels all 
States to criminalise certain conducts related to foreign terrorist fighters, such as 
travelling abroad for terrorist purposes or financing terrorism. Following this pathway, 
the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of 
Terrorism was adopted in Riga one year later (Riga Protocol)2. In 2017, the European 
Union (EU) decided to incorporate these measures against foreign terrorist fighters 
through the EU Directive on combating terrorism3.  
All these instruments share a common feature: the use of criminal measures to prevent 
and punish conducts associated to foreign terrorist fighters. They also share one main 
criticism: the lack of respect for certain fundamental rights and freedoms. For instance, 
the Meijers Committee has declared that the EU Directive on combating terrorism 
“creates a far-reaching extension of the scope of Member States' criminal law 
obligations in the field of terrorism that takes these obligations even further into the 
preparatory phase of possible harmful conduct”4. Among the different conducts that 
should be criminalised by States under these international obligations, the act of 
travelling abroad is a self-evident restriction to the right to free movement of persons, a 
right which constitutes one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU system.  
The first part of this study introduces the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Europe and 
provides a review of international measures that have influenced the content of the EU 
Directive on combating terrorism. Then, this study examines the relationship between 
freedom of movement and EU criminal law. The research paper concludes with an 
analysis of relevant case law on how criminal measures against foreign terrorist fighters 
should be applied in order to respect fundamental rights and freedoms and, in particular, 
the freedom of movement.  
II. The phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters in Europe 
 
The departure of European citizens to join conflicts in the territory of other states is not 
a new phenomenon. The motivation of foreign fighters, however, is in constant 
                                                
2 See Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS 
No. 217), adopted 22 October 2015 (entered into force 1 July 2017).  
3 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on 
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council 
Decision 2005/671/JHA, OJ 2017 L 88/6. 
4 Meijers Committee, Note on a Proposal for a Directive on combating terrorism, 16 March 2016. 
Available on: 
 http://www.commissie-
meijers.nl/sites/all/files/cm1603_note_on_a_proposal_for_a_directive_on_combating_terrorism_.pdf 
(Last visit: 02/11/2017).  
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evolution and differs from one case to another5. During the Spanish Civil War or, more 
recently, during the current conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the 
predominant motivation has been political or ideological6. Religion has also motivated 
thousands of European Muslims to leave their countries to join conflicts in the Middle 
East7.  
After the Paris attacks of November 2015, Europe became completely aware of the link 
between European foreign fighters and terrorism. The intention to perpetrate terrorist 
attacks includes not only the places of conflict abroad but also their countries of 
nationality and residence upon their return8. In 2016, Europe was positioned as the third 
region sending more foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and Iraq9. Even so, Muslim 
communities in the countries of destination continue to be the main victims of terrorist 
attacks worldwide10.   
Nowadays, the loss of territories by Daesh in Syria and Iraq is causing a “terrorist 
diaspora” of foreign fighters11. In consequence, the return of foreign fighters to their 
countries of residence is a primary concern for the international community and, in 
particular, for the European Union and its Members States. Julian King, the EU 
Commissioner for the Security of the Union, has declared that “the retaking of 
Isis’s northern Iraq stronghold, Mosul, may lead to the return to Europe of violent ISIS-
fighters”12. Recent studies show that an estimated 30 percent of EU foreign terrorist 
fighters, around 1,200 people, have already returned to their countries of origin13.  
                                                
5 For a comprehensive study see A. Reed, J. Pohl and M. Jegerings, The Four Dimensions of the Foreign 
Fighter Threat: Making Sense of an Evolving Phenomenon, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 
June 2017. Available on: 
 https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ICCT-Reed-Pohl-The-Four-Dimensions-of-the-Foreign-
Fighters-Threat-June-2017.pdf (Last visit: 02/11/2017).  
6 B. Johnstons, Legions of Babel: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, Penn State 
University Press, 1967; K. Rekawek, Neither NATO’S Foreign Legion Nor the Donbass International 
Brigades: (Where Are All the) Foreign Fighters in Ukraine?”, The Polish Institute for International 
Affairs, No. 6, March 2015. Available online on:  
https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19434 (Last visit: 02/11/2017).  
7 A. Rustamova, Archipielago SYRAQ: Jihadist Foreign Fighters from A to Z, Teknur, 2012.  
8 I. Marrero Rocha, Los Combatientes Terroristas Extranjeros de la Unión Europea a la Luz de la 
Resolución 2178 (2014) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, Revista de Derecho 
Comunitario Europeo, No. 54, 2016, pp. 555-592.  
9 Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Report 2016: Boundless Crises, Reckless Spoilers, 
Helpless Guardians, p. 21. Available on:  
 https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/MunichSecurityReport/MunichSecurityReport_2016.pdf 
(Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
10 M. Farivar, Most Terrorism Victims are in Muslim majority Countries, Voice of America News, 25 
August 2016. Available on: 
 https://www.voanews.com/a/most-terrorism-victims-are-in-mulim-majority-countires/3478905.html 
(Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
11 C.P. Clarke, The Terrorist Diaspora: After the Fall of the Caliphate, The RAND Corporation, 
Testimony Before the Committee of Homeland Security of the United States, 13 July 2017. Available on: 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT480/RAND_CT480.pdf (Last visit: 
02/11/2017) 
12 B. Mckernan, EU faces influx of Isis fighters as they flee Mosul offensive, top official warns, The 
Independent, 18 October 2016. Available online on:  
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/mosul-offensive-isis-eu-warning-iraq-syria-
terrorism-a7367721.html (Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
13  B. Van Ginkel and E. Entrenmann (Eds.), The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: 
Profiles, Threats & Policies, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, April 2016, p. 3. Available 
online on: 
4 
 
Despite the reality of this threat, we cannot ignore recent studies about the different 
itineraries followed by foreign terrorist fighters after they leave their country of origin 
to join the conflict in Syria or Iraq, for instance. These options include indeed the 
participation in terrorist activities, but also disappointment in the actions of terrorist 
groups and the surrender of weapons in order to participate in humanitarian missions14. 
Furthermore, their return to their home countries does not necessarily imply a re-
engagement in terrorist activities in a majority of cases, although the impact of these 
few exceptions is tremendously high15.  
III. Previous international measures against foreign terrorist fighters 
 
A. UNSC Resolution 2178 
 
The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) was the first international 
organization to address the issue of foreign fighters joining terrorist organizations16. 
However, the term “foreign terrorist fighters” only became widespread after UNSC 
Resolution 2178 which defines foreign terrorist fighters as “nationals who travel or 
attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other 
individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than 
their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or 
preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist 
training, including in connection with armed conflicts”17.  
 
In its Resolution 2178, the UNSC expressed its concerns about the fact that “foreign 
terrorist fighters increase the intensity, duration and intractability of conflicts, and also 
may pose a serious threat to their States of origin, the States they transit and the States 
to which they travel, as well as States neighbouring zones of armed conflict in which 
foreign terrorist fighters are active and that are affected by serious security burdens”, as 
well as it noted that “the threat of foreign terrorist fighters may affect all regions and 
Member States, even those far from conflict zones”18. As a result, the UNSC called 
upon all Member States to adopt measures to combat this phenomenon. Among the 
State’s different obligations, some make specific references to the “travel” and 
“movement” of foreign terrorist fighters:  
 
                                                                                                                                          
 https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-
April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf (Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
14 A. Reed, J. R. Van Zuijdewijn and E. Bakker, Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and Their 
(Un)Intended Consequences, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, April 2015. Available on: 
https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/ICCT-Reed-De-Roy-Van-Zuijdewijn-Bakker-Pathways-
Of-Foreign-Fighters-Policy-Options-And-Their-Un-Intended-Consequences-April2015.pdf (Last visit: 
02/11/2017) 
15 E. Bakker and J.R. Van Zuijdewijn, Jihadist Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in Western Europe: A Low-
Probability, High-Impact Threat, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, October 2015. Available 
on: 
 https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ICCT-Bakker-DeRoyvanZuijdewijn-Jihadist-Foreign-
Fighter-Phenomenon-in-Western-Europe-October2015.pdf (Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
16 INTERPOL, Foreign fighters threat focus on INTERPOL counterterrorism meeting. Available on:  
https://www.interpol.int/en/Internet/News-and-media/News/2013/N20130712 (Last visit: ).  
17 UNSC, Resolution 2178 of 24th September 2014, Doc. S/RES/2178, pp. 4-5.  Available on:  
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf (Last visit: 02/11/2017)  
18 Idem, p. 2.  
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• Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border 
controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and 
through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of 
identity papers and travel document (paragraph 2).  
•  Intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information regarding 
actions or movements of terrorists or terrorist networks (paragraph 3).  
• Cooperate in efforts to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, 
including by preventing the radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of 
foreign terrorist fighters, and preventing financial support to foreign terrorist 
fighters (paragraph 4).  
•  Prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of 
individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or 
nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or 
participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, 
and the financing of their travel and of their activities (paragraph 5).  
• Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation 
or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to 
justice, and that all States shall ensure that their domestic laws and regulations 
establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute 
and to penalize in a manner duly reflecting the seriousness of the offense 
(paragraph 6):  
a) their nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their 
States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or 
attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of 
residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or 
preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or 
receiving of terrorist training;  
b)  the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, 
of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the 
funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in 
order to finance the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than 
their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, 
planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the 
providing or receiving of terrorist training; and,  
c) The wilful organization, or other facilitation, including acts of 
recruitment, by their nationals or in their territories, of the travel of 
individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or 
nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation 
of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of 
terrorist training; 
• Prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of any individual about 
whom that State has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to 
believe that he or she is seeking entry into or transit through their territory for 
the purpose of participating in the acts described in paragraph 6 (paragraph 8).  
 
UNSC Resolution 2178 has been, along with UNSC Resolutions 1373 and 2249, one of 
the most commented texts by the literature specialized on terrorism and international 
law. In order to avoid an excessive expansion of the scope of this study, we will focus 
exclusively on issues concerning the free movement of persons. In this regard, the first 
and most basic obligation imposed of States is the prevention of entry and departure of 
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foreign terrorist fighters from and to their territories. The problem here stands out by 
itself: how can be detected an alleged terrorist who has not manifested yet his 
intentions? Or, as KAMBOS expresses in more concrete terms: “how can it be 
determined whether a person is travelling to Turkey as a tourist or is only using Turkey 
as a transit country to join IS in Iraq or Syria?”19. The Resolution relies on “credible 
information” as the basis for “reasonable grounds to believe” (paragraph 8) that the 
person in question is pursuing a terrorist purpose, an assessment which must not be 
“based on stereotypes founded on grounds of discrimination prohibited by international 
law” (paragraph 2).  
 
In addition to this general obligation of controlling the movement of foreign terrorist 
fighters, paragraph 6 contains the duty to criminalize certain conducts, in what 
SCHEININ has defined as the “most alarming provision” of this Resolution20. For this 
author and many others, this expansion of criminal law responses and the lack of 
definition of terrorism act as an “open door” for “oppressive regimes that choose to 
stigmatize as ‘terrorism’ whatever they do not like – for instance political opposition, 
trade unions, religious movements, minority groups, etc”21.  
 
In particular, the criminalization of conducts such as “the travel or attempt to travel” for 
terrorist purposes, as well as its financing, organization or facilitation, raises important 
concerns about its impact on the freedom of movement, the right to return to one’s 
country of nationality and the freedom of entry into a State22. The wording of this 
obligation can even lead to a de facto prohibition to travel to countries affected by 
terrorist violence. And this is not a mere hypothesis: the last amendment to the 
Australian counter-terrorism law (the “Foreign Fighter Bill”) establishes that “a person 
commits an offence if enters, or remains, in an area of a foreign country” that has been 
declared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an area in which “a listed terrorist 
organization is engaging in terrorist activity”, with the exception of entering or 
remaining solely for the legitimate purposes enlisted in the amendment23.  
 
B. The Riga Protocol 
Two months after the approval of UNSC Resolution 2178, the Committee of Experts on 
Terrorism of the Council of Europe (CODEXTER) included in its agenda the study of 
the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters. Following the instructions of the Secretary 
General of this organization, they proposed to the Council of Ministers the creation of a 
new ad hoc committee with the mission of elaborating a Draft Protocol to the Council 
                                                
19 See K. Ambos, Our terrorists, your terrorists? The United Nations Security Council urges states to 
combat ‘foreign terrorist fighters’, but does not define ‘terrorism’, EJIL Talk, 2014. Available on:  
https://www.ejiltalk.org/our-terrorists-your-terrorists-the-united-nations-security-council-urges-states-to-
combat-foreign-terrorist-fighters-but-does-not-define-terrorism/ (Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
20 See M. Scheinin, Back to post-9/11 panic? Security Council resolution on foreign terrorist fighters, Just 
Security, 2014. Available on: https://www.justsecurity.org/15407/post-911-panic-security-council-
resolution-foreign-terrorist-fighters-scheinin/ (Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
21 I. Marrero Rocha, cit. supra., p. 587; Scheinin, cit. supra.  
22 A. Conte, States’ Prevention and Responses to the Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters against the 
Backdrop of International Human Rights Obligations, in A. De Guttry, F. Capone and C. Paulussen, 
Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond, 2016, Springer, p. 286. 
23 Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighter) Act 2014, Núm. 116. Available on: 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2014A00116/Download (Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
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of Europe Convention on the Prevention on Terrorism24. The project was accepted and 
on 21 January 2015 the Council set up the Committee on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and 
Related Issues (COD-CTE)25.   
As a result of nine months of work at the COD-CTE, the Riga Protocol was adopted. 
This instrument calls upon State Parties to criminalize the conducts of: participating in 
an association or group for the purpose of terrorism (article 2); receiving training for 
terrorism (art. 3); travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (art. 4); funding 
travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (art. 5); and organizing or otherwise 
facilitating travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (art. 6).  
Taking into account that the content of the Riga Protocol is quite similar to the 
provisions of UNSC Resolution 2178, the criticism against it follows the same pathway. 
For SCHEININ, “Council of Europe member states have a legal obligation to 
implement UNSC Res. 2178 (despite the problems in the drafting of that resolution), but 
sloppy drafting of implementing legislation at the European level will only aggravate 
the problems inherent in the resolution itself”26. And these problems are especially 
grave if we consider that the Riga Protocol “seeks to address form of conduct, such as 
foreign travel, that are routinely exercised by law-abiding people for legitimate 
reasons”27.  
Several NGOs such as Amnesty International and the International Commission of 
Jurists have focused precisely on issues regarding the criminalization on travelling. 
Article 4 of the Riga Protocol engage “the right to freedom of movement, which 
includes the freedom to leave any country, including one’s own. Under Article 2 of 
Protocol 4 ECHR, and Article 12 ICCPR, the right to leave one’s country may be 
limited only where strictly necessary and proportionate”28. In order to ensure the 
necessity and proportionality of these measures, they would have to comply with the 
principle of legality and, at the same time, to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory 
application in practice. In this sense, the offence of “travelling abroad for the purpose of 
terrorism” should require a clearly demonstrated intent to commit or otherwise 
participate in the commission of a criminal act.  
Fully aware of the previous criticism, the drafters decided that every act criminalized 
according to the Riga Protocol should be committed “unlawfully and intentionally”. 
These two concepts are not defined in the Protocol but in its Explanatory Report29. A 
report which clarifies, first of all, “that the obligation to adopt, where necessary, 
criminal offences for certain conduct does not require the Parties to establish self-
                                                
24 See Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 196), adopted 16 May 
2005 (entered into force 1 June 2007).  
25 Council of Europe action against radicalisation leading to terrorism, Doc. SG/Inf (2015) 4, CM (2015) 
19-rev, DD (2015) 95, 21 January 2015. Available on:   
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805c4600 (Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
26 M. Scheinin, The Council of Europe’s Protocol on Foreign Terrorist Fighters is Fundamentally Flawed, 
Just Security, 2015. Available on: https://www.justsecurity.org/21207/council-europe-draft-protocol-
foreign-terrorist-fighters-fundamentally-flawed/ (Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
27 SCHEININ, “The Council of Europe”, cit. supra. 
28 Submission of Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists to the Council of 
Europe Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER): Draft Additional Protocol to the Council of 
Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, AI Index: IOR 60/1393/2015, 7 de abril de 2015, p. 
2.  
29 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention 
on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS No. 217), of 22 October 2015. Available on:   
https://rm.coe.int/168047c5ec (Last visit: 02/11/2017).   
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standing offences to the extent that under the relevant legal system these acts may be 
considered as preparatory acts to the commission of terrorist offences or are 
criminalised under other provisions, including those related to attempt”30. 
On the one hand, “unlawfully” refers to “conduct undertaken without authority (whether 
legislative, executive, administrative, judicial, contractual or consensual) or conduct that 
is otherwise not covered by established legal defences or relevant principles under 
domestic law”31. In consequence, the Protocol “leaves unaffected conduct which is 
otherwise lawful under the domestic law of the Parties, such as conduct undertaken 
pursuant to lawful government authority”32. 
On the other hand, the criminal offence should be committed “intentionally”. According 
to the Explanatory Report, the “exact meaning of ‘intentionally’ in accordance with 
established practice of the Council of Europe in the drafting of legally binding criminal 
law instruments should be left to interpretation under domestic law”33. In addition to 
this general requirement, “the offences in Articles 2 to 6 require a further subjective 
element, being either a terrorist purpose (as defined in Articles 2 to 4) or the knowledge 
about the terrorist purpose (as defined in Articles 5 and 6)”34. These precisions can be 
easily identified with the general scheme of international criminal law which 
distinguishes, within the subjective element (mens rea), between the general intent 
(dolus generalis) and the specific intent of the author (dolus specialis)35. And last but 
not least, the Report highlights that States “shall take into account that Articles 2 to 6 
criminalise behaviour at a stage preceding the actual commission of a terrorist offence 
but already having the potential to lead to the commission of such acts. The conditions 
under which the conduct in question is criminalised need to be foreseeable with legal 
certainty […]. As always, the principle of the presumption of innocence should be 
respected, and the burden of proof lies with the State”36.  
Along with these requirements, which are applicable to all conducts, the Explanatory 
Report gives special attention to the offence of travelling abroad for terrorist purposes 
and its impact on the free movement of persons. As some NGOs did before them, the 
drafters “took due note of the fact that the right to freedom of movement is enshrined in 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, as well as in Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations”37.  
However, the Explanatory Report points out something that will be further analysed in 
the context of the EU Directive on combating terrorism: “both of the aforesaid 
international human rights instruments allow for the right to freedom of movement to be 
restricted under certain conditions, including the protection of national security, and (as 
regards Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms) for the prevention of crime”38. In this sense, the drafters of the 
                                                
30 Explanatory Report, paragraph 21.  
31 Idem, margin no. 26.  
32 Idem, margin no. 27.  
33 Idem, margin no 28.  
34 Idem.  
35 See E. Wilmshurst, Transnational Crimes, Terrorism and Torture, in R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson 
and E. Wilmshurst, (Eds.), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 2010, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 347. 
36 Explanatory Report, cit. supra., margin no. 30.  
37 Idem, margin no. 45.  
38 Idem.  
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Riga Protocol considered “that the seriousness of the threat posed by foreign terrorist 
fighters warrants a robust response which, on the other hand, should be fully compatible 
with human rights and the rule of law”39. 
 In order to be fully compatible with human rights and the rule of law, the Explanatory 
Report makes several remarks. First at all, it emphasised that “Article 4 does not contain 
an obligation for Parties to introduce a blanket ban on, or criminalisation of, all travels 
to certain destinations”40. In addition, two requirements must be fulfilled: “firstly, the 
real purpose of the travel must be for the perpetrator to commit or participate in terrorist 
offences, or to receive or provide training for terrorism, in a State other than that of 
nationality or residence […]; secondly, the perpetrator must commit the crime 
intentionally and unlawfully”41.  
IV. Freedom of movement vs the effectiveness of EU criminal law: general 
considerations 
 
Because of different legal and political reasons, European Union criminal law has been 
one of the most controversial elements of the EU design since its formal creation42. One 
of the main reasons is the inherent and at the same time difficult link with human rights, 
given that “the penal instrument has both the power to protect and to compress 
fundamental rights”43. In order to determine how is the relationship between free 
movement of persons (fundamental freedoms) and the EU Directive on combating 
terrorism (EU criminal justice measures) we should commence by referring, at least 
briefly, to the system of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and the actors 
involved. 
According to article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union44, we can distinguish three 
sources of protection of fundamental rights: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (EU Charter), which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties; 
fundamental rights as general principles of EU law as guaranteed by the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States; and the ECHR as an independent source once 
the EU will accede to the Convention45.  
                                                
39 Idem, margin no. 46.  
40 Idem, margin no. 48.  
41 Idem.  
42 See S. Peers, Mission accomplished? EU Justice and Home Affairs law after the Treaty of Lisbon, 
Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2011, pp. 661-693.  
43 P. De Hert, EU criminal law and fundamental rights, in V. Mitsilegas, M. Bergström and T. 
Konstadinides, Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law, 2016, Edward Elgar, p. 105.  
44 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, OJ C 2012 326. 
45 For an analysis of the Opinion 2/13 and the non-accession of the EU to the ECHR, see J.P. Jacqué, 
Pride and/or Prejudice? Les lectures Possibles de l’avis 2/13 de la Court de Justice, Cahiers de droit 
europeen, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2015, pp. 19-45; K. Lenaerts, La Vie Après l’Avis: The Principle of Mutual 
(Yet not Blind) Trust, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 54, 2017, pp. 805-840; T. Ackermann et al., 
The EU’S Accession to the ECHR – a ‘NO’ from the ECJ”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 52, 
2015, pp. 1-16; D. Halberstam, It’s the Autonomy, Stupid! A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU 
Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward, German Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 
2015, pp. 105-146; S. Peers, The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare, 
German Journal of International Law, Vol 16, No. 1, 2015, pp. 213-222; B. De Witte and S. Imamovi, 
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The complexity coming from this plurality of sources is enhanced by the plurality of 
actors who are involved46. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) “shall 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed”47, so 
this actor is entrusted with interpreting and ruling on the EU Charter. The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is crucial for the interpretation of fundamental rights 
as general principles of EU law48. And, finally, national courts have the obligation to 
apply EU fundamental rights law49, expanding the scope of such rights in certain 
occasions thanks to the mechanism of the preliminary ruling50. The role of these three 
actors in the field of counter-terrorism measures and its impact on free movement will 
be analysed in the next section.  
As we have mentioned above, the main instrument for the protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the EU is the EU Charter. Freedom of movement is protected 
under article 45 of the EU Charter: “every citizen of the Union has the right to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States”. The Explanations relating 
to the EU Charter elaborate that “the right guaranteed by paragraph 1 is the right 
guaranteed by Article 20(2)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
In accordance with Article 52(2) of the Charter, those rights are to be applied under the 
conditions and within the limits defined by the Treaties”51. In consequence, this right is 
a fundamental part of the EU citizenship.   
Regarding the conditions and limitations, article 52 of the EU Charter recognises 
possible restrictions to the rights enshrined by the same text, but they “must be provided 
for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle 
of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others”. The Explanations refer to the concept of “general 
interest” as including “both the objectives mentioned in Article 3 of the Treaty on 
European Union and other interests protected by specific provisions of the Treaties such 
as Article 4(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 35(3), 36 and 346 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”52.  
Initially, it was the existence of terrorism, aggravated by the lack of satisfactory means 
of control and punishment, what was considered as a deterrent to the exercise of the 
right of free movement53. Nowadays, the means of control of terrorism are considered 
by many as deterrence itself. The main derogations to the right of free movement of 
                                                                                                                                          
Opinion 2/13 on accession to the ECHR: defending the EU legal order against a foreign human rights 
court, European Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2015, pp. 683-705.  
46 De Hert, cit. supra., p. 108.  
47 Article 19.  
48 For a study of the influence of the ECtHR in the EU legal order see D. Appanah, Charte des Droits 
Fondamentaux de l’Union Européenne des Droits de l’Homme: entre cohérence et légitimation, Revue 
général de droit international public, 2014, p. 343; T. Lock, The European Court of Justice and 
International Courts, 2015, Oxford University Press, pp. 182-183; K. Lenaerts and E. De Smitjer, The 
Charter and the Role of the European Courts, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 
8, 2001, p. 99.  
49 See Court of Justice of the European Union, 24.03.1994, case 2/92 (Bostock), margin no. 16.  
50 See Court of Justice of the European Union, 16.06.2005, case 105/03 (Criminal proceedings against 
Maria Pupina).  
51 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, of 14 December 2007, OJ 303, p. 29.  
52 Idem, p. 32.  
53 European Parliament, Report drawn up on behalf of the Legal Affairs Committee on the European 
Judicial areas (Tyrell Report), 1982, Doc. 1-318/82, p. 16.  
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persons can be found in the Directive on the Rights of Citizens of the Union and their 
Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member States 
(Citizens’ Rights Directive)54. One of them allows Member States to restrict this right 
on grounds of “public security”55. According to the CJEU, this concept covers “a threat 
to the functioning of the institutions and essential public services and the survival of the 
population, as well as the risk of a serious disturbance to foreign relations or to peaceful 
coexistence of nations, or a risk to military interests”56. This derogation “must be based 
exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned”57. In the case of 
counterterrorism, the CJEU has accepted that prevention of terrorism can be regarded as 
falling within the maintenance of public security for the purpose of limiting the freedom 
of movement for persons58.  
Apart from this general derogation based on public security, and terrorism as a threat to 
it, freedom of movement can be also limited by criminal measures. The EU Directive on 
combating terrorism is based on UNSC Resolution 2178 and the Riga Protocol. As we 
have seen in the previous pages, both instruments have been widely criticised for 
violating several rights, such as the freedom of movement as protected by article 2 of 
Protocol 4 ECHR and article 12 ICCPR. The EU instrument has been, therefore, 
criticised on the same grounds: “the directive requires states to criminalise a series of 
preparatory acts that may have a minimal or no direct link to a violent act of terrorism, 
and may never result in one being committed. For example, the offences of participating 
in a terrorist group, travelling or receiving training for terrorist purposes are not 
adequately defined. Unless these broadly outlined offences are subject to careful 
drafting and strong safeguards in national law, they are likely to lead to violations of 
rights, including the right to liberty and freedoms of expression, association, and 
movement”59.  
It would not be the first time that a piece of EU legislation has been declared invalid 
because of its impact on fundamental rights60. In the field of EU criminal measures and 
its implementation by Member States, the CJEU has established that there must be a due 
respect to EU fundamental rights61. However, the CJEU has “provided very restrictive 
interpretation of the range of fundamental rights, when they clash with the effective 
implementation of EU law, more specifically with EU criminal law”62. Two cases 
highlight this trend within the CJEU.  
                                                
54 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, OJ 2004 L 158.  
55 Citizen’s Rights Directive, cit. supra., article 27 (1).  
56 Court of Justice of the European Union, 23.10.2010, case 145/09 (Tsakouridis), margin no. 44.  
57 Citizen’s Rights Directive, cit. supra., article 27(2).  
58 Court of Justice of the European Union, 26.11.2002, case 100/01 (Olazabal), margin no. 35.  
59 International Commission of Jurists, “European Union Directive on Counterterrorism is Seriously 
Flawed”, Press Release, 30 November 2016. Available on: 
 https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/EU-Press-Release-Flawed-Counterterrorism-Directive-
2016-ENG.docx.pdf  (Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
60 See, for example, the famous judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 8.04.2014, 
joined cases 293/12 and 594/12 (Digital Rights Ireland), in which the ECJ declared that the Directive on 
retention of data was invalid on the ground of data protection and privacy.  
61 Court of Justice of the European Union, 26.02.2013, case 617/10 (Akerberg Fransson), margin no. 27.   
62 De Hert, cit. supra., p. 111.  
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In the Melloni case, the CJEU faced a clash between the Spanish standard on the right to 
defence and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)63, an act of secondary legislation. 
Although national constitutional traditions are part of the EU system of protection of 
fundamental rights, the CJEU considered case that “national authorities and courts 
remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided 
that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and 
the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised”64. As a 
result, the CJEU precluded the possibility of making the execution of an EAW 
conditional upon the respect of the right of defence as protected by the constitutional 
tradition of the executing Member States because. An opposite view “would undermine 
the principles of mutual trust and recognition which that decision purports to uphold and 
would, therefore, compromise the efficacy of that framework decision”65. 
The EAW was also the subject matter of the Radu case, this time because of a breach of 
the right to liberty and security, to the presumption of innocence and the right to 
defence. Advocate General Sharpston considered that “the decision does not affect the 
obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental principles. […]. The duty to 
respect those rights and principles permeates the Framework Decision. It is implicit that 
those rights may be taken into account in founding a decision not to execute a warrant. 
To interpret Article 1(3) otherwise would risk its having no meaning – otherwise, 
possibly, than as an elegant platitude”66. In consequence, she recommended that “the 
competent judicial authority of the State executing a European arrest warrant can refuse 
the request for surrender without being in breach of the obligations authorised by the 
founding Treaties and the other provisions of Community law, where it is shown that 
the human rights of the person whose surrender is requested have been infringed, or will 
be infringed, as part of or following the surrender process”67. Contrary to this 
recommendation, the ECJ established again that “the European legislature has ensured 
that the right to be heard will be observed in the executing Member State in such a way 
as not to compromise the effectiveness of the European arrest warrant system”68. 
V. The EU Directive on combating terrorism 
 
A. Legal basis and content  
In June 2013, the Justice and Home Affairs Council backed the package of 22 measures 
against foreign terrorist fighters proposed by the EU Counter-Terrorism coordinator69. 
This package was the basis of future actions such as the reinforcement of the Schengen 
Framework, the Passenger Name Record System (PNR), the prioritization of 
                                                
63 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 
2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the 
procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, OJ 2009 81.  
64 Court of Justice of the European Union, 26.02.2013, case 399/11 (Stefano Melloni), margin no. 60.  
65 Idem, margin no. 63.  
66 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, 18.10.2012, case 396/11 (Ciprian Basile Radu), margin no. 
70.  
67 Idem, margin no. 97.  
68 Court of Justice of the European Union, 29.01.2013, case 396/11 (Ciprian Basile Radu), margin no. 41.  
69 Council of the European Union, 3244th meeting in Justice and Home Affairs, 6 and 7 June 2013, Press 
Release p. 17. Available on:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/137407.pdf  
(Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
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information sharing and operational cooperation and, in line with the two instruments 
analysed above, the criminalization of certain conducts usually associated with the 
activity of foreign terrorist fighters70.  
Regarding the harmonization of criminal law, the European Council asked the 
Commission to assess if the EU Decision on combating terrorism71 needed an update, 
following the reports of Eurojust about existing gaps in the prosecution of foreign 
terrorist fighters72. As a result, the EU Council and the Parliament approved on 15 
March 2017 the EU Directive on combating terrorism73. According to its article 1, this 
new legal tool establishes “minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions in the area of terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist 
group and offences related to terrorist activities”.  
The legal basis of this recent EU Directive is article 83.1 of the Treaty of Functioning of 
the European Union, according to which “the European Parliament and the Council 
may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and 
sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension 
resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat 
them on a common basis. These areas of crime are the following: terrorism […]”74.  
The Directive categorizes the offences in three groups: terrorist offences (article 3); 
offences relating a terrorist group (article 4) and offences related to terrorist activities 
(articles 5 to 12). We can find most of the new provisions against terrorism within the 
last category: receiving training for terrorism (article (8); travelling for the purpose of 
terrorism (article 9); organising or otherwise facilitating travelling for the purpose of 
terrorism (article 10) and the financing of such acts (article 11). In addition, there are 
specific mentions to the assistance and support to the victims of terrorism (article 24) in 
line with the EU Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and 
protection of victims of crime75.  
B. Ex ante review: the impact assessment 
During the legislative process that led to the adoption of this directive, one of criticism 
was the lack of an impact assessment of this legislation with respect to the EU 
Charter76. In the words of the European Commission, “the Impact Assessment is a 
valuable tool for examining different policy options, demonstrating that in proposing 
                                                
70 See G. De Kerchove and C. Höhn, The Regional Answers and Governance Structure for Dealing with 
Foreign Fighters: The Case of the EU, in A. De Guttry, F. Capone and C. Paulussen (Eds.), Foreign 
Fighters under International Law and Beyond, 2016, Springer, pp. 305-319. 
71 See Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism as amended by Council 
Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008, OJ 2002 L 164.  
72 Anti-terrorism: Eurojust in the European Parliament – Foreign Fighters in Focus, Press Release. 
Available on:  
 http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/News/News/Pages/2014/2014-11-06_LIBE-Committee-debate.aspx 
(Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
73 See EU Directive on combating terrorism, cit. supra.  
74 For a critical assesment of the role of the EU in this field see N. Corral-Maraver, Irrationality as a 
Challenge to European Criminal Policy, European Criminal Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2017, pp. 123-
150.  
75 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing 
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ 2012 L 315.  
76 International Commission of Jurists, cit. supra.,  
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new EU legislation the Commission has taken full account of the fundamental rights 
protected by the Charter. Properly assessing any impact on fundamental rights in the 
preparatory stages of new legislation will therefore not only contribute to finding the 
most appropriate solution to a given problem, but will also strengthen the defence of EU 
legislation against legal challenges before the European Court of Justice”77.  
However, in the case the EU Directive on combating terrorism, the European 
Commission (EC) considered that “given the urgent need to improve the EU framework 
to increase security in the light of recent terrorist attacks including by incorporating 
international obligations and standards, this proposal is exceptionally presented without 
an impact assessment”78. There will be an assessment, but not until the 8 September 
2021, when the EC will have to “submit a report to the European Parliament and to the 
Council, assessing the added value of this Directive with regard to combating terrorism. 
The report shall also cover the impact of this Directive on fundamental rights and 
freedoms”.  
This has been criticised by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs: “particularly striking is the lack of an Impact Assessment 
where the new Directive on Combating Terrorism that is to replace Framework 
Decision 2002/475 is concerned. None of the Council initiatives have been 
accompanied by an Impact Assessment. The lack of public consultations and ex ante 
assessments is not compensated by ex post reviews or evaluations”79. And, more 
specifically, the Meijers Committee has considered that “such a rushed procedure does 
not do justice to the importance of a balanced legal response to terrorism, especially 
since the proposal concerns far-reaching powers under criminal law that can be 
exercised at a very early stage and that can have a serious impact on people’s lives”80.  
In line with the words of the EC, some authors have pointed out the importance that ex 
ante impact assessments can have for the CJEU: “When considering the impacts of a 
measure for the purpose of assessing its proportionality, the Court is investigating its 
legal impact. Thus, as any lawyer would do, the Court considers questions such as 
which changes to the pre-existing law resulted from the measure in question, whether 
those changes constitute a prima facie interference with fundamental rights, and if so 
whether that interference is proportionate”81. 
 
 
                                                
77 European Commission, Operation Guidance on taking account of Fundamental Rights in Commission 
Impact Assessments, SEC (2011) 567 final, p. 5. For a study of this tool see O. De Schutter, Impact 
Assessments, in S. Peers (et al.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, 2014, Hart 
Publishing, pp. 1645-1648.  
78 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, COM (2015) 625 final, p. 
12.  
79 Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, The European Union’s Policies on Counter-Terrorism: Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 
2017, p. 17.  
80 Meijers Committee, Note on a Prpposal for a Directive on combating terrorism, CM1603, 16 March 
2016. Available online on: 
 http://www.commissie-
meijers.nl/sites/all/files/cm1603_note_on_a_proposal_for_a_directive_on_combating_terrorism_.pdf  
81 F. de Londras, Accounting for Rights in EU Counter-Terrorism: Towards Effective Review, Columbia 
Journal of European Law, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2016, p. 256.  
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C. Ex post facto review: judicial responses to criminal measures against foreign 
terrorist fighters 
The EU Directive on combating terrorism has not been challenged yet, and it can be 
argued that disproportionate and highly intrusive supranational legislation can be made 
even worse by its national implementation82. However, we must not forget the control 
that courts of justice exercise in specific cases in relation to this tension between 
fundamental freedoms, on the one side, and security, on the other. Even if the youth of 
the Riga Protocol and the EU Directive makes it difficult to find case law in this field, it 
is not completely inexistent. In this sense, we will comment relevant case law of the 
CJEU, the ECtHR and the domestic courts (more specifically, the Spanish Supreme 
Court and the special jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism, Audiencia Nacional). This 
will help to identify a first set of reactions of the judiciary in front of these initiatives 
against foreign terrorist fighters. 
In the recent Lounani case83, the main question was whether an application for refugee 
protection (as regulated by the Qualification Directive84) could be excluded even when 
there was not a conviction for terrorist offences as such (like the organising travelling 
for the purpose of terrorism) in the sense of the previous Framework Decision on 
combating terrorism (which, at that time, did not contain the crime of the organising or 
act of travelling for terrorist purposes). AG Sharpston considered that the Decision on 
combating terrorism and the Qualification Directive have different legal basis, and 
therefore exclusion under the latter is not dependent on the existence of a prior criminal 
conviction within the meaning of the Framework Decision85. However, she recognises 
the difficulty to interpret exclusions based on acts of terrorism: “But how far does that 
extension under Article 12(3) go? Where along the spectrum that stretches from a 
person who is merely shaking a collecting tin in the street to an individual who is 
directly involved in a terrorist attack as the driver of the getaway car should the line be 
drawn?”86.  
The CJEU accepted the outcome of the AG, though the reasoning is mostly based on 
UNSC Resolution 2178. From this international resolution it follows that the application 
of the ground of exclusion of refugee status “cannot be confined to the actual 
perpetrators of terrorist acts, but can also extend to those who engage in activities 
consisting in the recruitment, organisation, transportation or equipment of individuals 
who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose 
of, inter alia, the perpetration, planning or preparation of terrorist acts”87. The judgment 
recalls, specifically, that UNSC Resolution 2178 identifies “among the activities to be 
combated by States as part of the fight against international terrorism, the wilful 
organisation of the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their State of 
residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of 
                                                
82 M. Bobek, The Fight against Terror and the Space of Individual Freedom: A (Classic) Word of Caution, 
in I. Govaere. and S. Poli, EU Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating 
Threats and Crises, 2014, Brill Nijhoff, p. 268.  
83 Court of Justice of the European Union, 31.01.2017, case 573/14 (Mostafa Lounani).   
84 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, 
and for the content of the protection granted, OJ 2011 L 337.  
85 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, 31.01.2017, case 573/14 (Mostafa Louani), margin no. 55-56.  
86 Idem, margin no. 73.  
87 Court of Justice of the European Union, Mostafa Lounani, cit. supra., margin no. 69.  
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terrorist acts”88. Professor Peers correctly points out that this pronouncement aligns the 
interpretation of the exclusion clause to some extent with recent developments in 
criminal law, namely the Riga Protocol and the EU Directive on combating terrorism89.  
In Tommaso v. Italy90, the ECtHR had the opportunity to address, with specific 
references to the Riga Protocol, the issue of preventive measures, restrictions on the 
ground of public security and the right to move and reside freely. In this case, a new set 
of Italian legislation contained new terrorist offences, notably one relating to travel by 
foreign fighters for terrorist purposes. The provisions allowed for an extension of the 
scope of preventive measures concerning individuals and property91. This national 
legislation would be in line with the Riga Protocol that “lays down an obligation for 
States to make it a criminal offence to travel, or attempt to travel, to a State other than 
the State of residence or nationality for the purpose of perpetrating, planning, preparing 
or participating in terrorist acts”92. In any case, the ECtHR recalls that the Citizens’ 
Rights Directive establishes on restrictions of the freedom of movement and residence 
on grounds of public security the obligation to “comply with the principle of 
proportionality and be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual 
concerned, which must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat 
affecting one of the fundamental interests of society”93.  
According to ECtHR’s settled case-law, “any measure restricting the right to liberty of 
movement must be in accordance with law, pursue one of the legitimate aims referred to 
in the third paragraph of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 and strike a fair balance between 
the public interest and the individual’s rights”94. The expression “in accordance with 
law” requires not only that “impugned measure should have some basis in domestic 
law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be 
accessible to the persons concerned and foreseeable as to its effects”95.  
But, what is the meaning of “foreseeable to its effects”? A question of extreme 
importance that, in a certain way, was posed by AG Sharpston when she asked what 
activities should be considered terrorists under recent developments in the field of 
counterterrorism law. In general terms, the ECtHR reiterates that “a norm cannot be 
regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to 
regulate their conduct; they must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to 
foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a 
given action may entail”96. The judges of Strasbourg accept, however, that “such 
consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to 
be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train 
excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. 
Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser 
                                                
88 Idem, magin no. 76.  
89 S. Peers, Foreign fighters’ helpers excluded from refugee status: the ECJ clarifies the law, EU Law 
Analysis, 31 January 2017. Available online on: 
 http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.es/2017/01/foreign-fighters-helpers-excluded-from.html  
(Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
90 Tommaso v. Italy, Application no. 43395/09, Judgment of 23 February 2017.  
91 Idem, margin no. 66.  
92 Idem, margin no. 73.  
93 Idem, margin no. 72.  
94 Idem, margin no. 104.  
95 Idem, margin no. 106.  
96 Idem, margin no. 107.  
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extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice 
[…]. The level of precision required of domestic legislation – which cannot in any case 
provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable degree on the content of the 
law in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to 
whom it is addressed”97.  
Are the new legal developments against foreign terrorist fighters able to fulfil the 
guarantees established by the ECtHR? In Tomasso v. Italy, the judgment found a 
violation of freedom of movement, but only because of the lack of proportionality of the 
measures imposed in that specific case. However, we can find some interesting 
reflections in the separate opinion of judge Pinto de Albuquerque.  For him, these kind 
of preventive measures are applied ante or praeter delictum, “being based on a highly 
indeterminate, probabilistic judgment on the future conduct of the suspected person”98. 
His conclusion about them is clear: “the Convention does not provide a ground for ante 
o praeter delictum deprivation of the right to liberty for the purposes of crime 
prevention”99. 
But the spirit of recent international instruments against foreign terrorist fighters (the 
UNSC Resolution 2178, the Riga Protocol and the EU Directive on combating 
terrorism) consists precisely in taking what before was a praetor delictum and 
transforming it into an actual crime100. This has been one of the ways of addressing the 
issue of, in words of Paulussen, “foreign fighters wannabes”101. The Spanish Criminal 
Code is a good example of national legislation amended in order to include crimes such 
as self-indoctrination or the attempt of travelling for terrorist purposes102.  What has 
been the attitude of Spanish courts, with long experience in dealing with terrorism 
(ETA), in front of these new criminal measures?  
Both the Audiencia Nacional and the Spanish Supreme Court rely on Resolution 2178 
to apply the domestic criminal code to specific cases, to an extent that makes one 
wonder about the direct effect of UNSC resolutions proposed by Peters103. While the 
                                                
97 Idem, margin no. 107 and 108.  
98 Tommaso v. Italy, Application no. 43395/09, Judgment of 23 February 2017, partly dissenting opinion 
of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, margin no. 8.  
99 Idem, margin no. 31.  
100 For a critical assessment of this new preventative focus of criminal law see M. Aksenova, Of Victims 
and Villains in the Fight Against International Terrorism, European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 10, No. 
1, 2017, pp. 17-38.  
101 C. Paulussen, Repressing the Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Terrorism in Western Europe: 
Towards an Effective Response Based on Human Rights, ICCT Research Paper , 2016, p. 3. Available 
online on: 
 https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Paulussen-Rule-of-Law-Nov2016-3.pdf  
(Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
102 Ley Orgánica 2/2015, de 30 de marzo, por la que se modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de 
noviembre, del Código Penal, en material de delitos de terrorismo, published in BOE Núm. 77, Sec. I, p. 
27177. Available online on: https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2015/03/31/pdfs/BOE-A-2015-3440.pdf  
(Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
For an overview of this legislation see R.L. Ponce de León, Foreign Fighters or Unlawful Civilians? An 
Overview of Foreign Fighters in Spanish Law, Military Law and the Law of War Review, Vol. 54, 2016, 
pp. 57-116.  
103 See A. Peters, Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): ‘The Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ as an 
International Legal Person, EJIL Talk, 2014. Available on: https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-
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(Last visit: 02/11/2017) 
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Audiencia Nacional does not have excessive issues with applying these new crimes104, 
the Supreme Court has annulled certain rulings of the Audiencia Nacional. The 
Supreme Court has pointed out that some of these crimes were not mentioned in the 
international instruments and, therefore, they must be applied restrictively. Taking into 
account the extreme “expansion of the barriers of protection” of criminal law done with 
these amendments105, procedural safeguards must not be forgotten at any time.  
VI. Conclusions 
Foreign terrorist fighters constitute a real threat for Europe, especially after the loss of 
territories by Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Preventing terrorist attacks on both European and 
foreign soil is a matter of general interest that justifies the obligation imposed on States 
to criminalise certain conducts related to this phenomenon. However, general interest is 
not the only element that should be taken into account. The criminalisation of travelling 
is a restriction to the right of free movement protected by the EU Charter, the ECHR 
and the ICCPR. In consequence, any restriction based on criminal law must comply 
with the general conditions to restrict a fundamental freedom as applied to the specific 
case of free movement of persons.  
The commitment of the EU to the protection of fundamental rights in the development 
of criminal law requires “not only that rights are would be taken into some account, but 
also that they would be taken into substantial and adequate account so that measures 
introduced with fundamental rights to the least extent possible”106. This commitment 
also ensures the own legitimacy of the EU counter-terrorism system: “the constitutional 
foundation of the of the EU […] perform the fundamental function of granting 
legitimacy to the EU counter-terrorism law and policy and ensuring its recognition as 
socially acceptable”107.  
As we have seen, the ex ante review of the protection of human rights through impact 
assessments have manifestly failed in the case of the measures against foreign terrorist 
fighters. We can ask ourselves if this mechanism should not be compulsory in the 
context of EU criminal law, as it will not only strengthen the protection of fundamental 
rights but will also add legitimacy to the entire system.  
In relation to the ex post facto review, both the CJEU and the ECtHR have established 
that law must provide such restrictions of fundamental freedoms. This refers not only to 
the quality of the law in question, but also in being able to foresee its effects: it should 
be formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct. 
Furthermore, such restrictions must be subject to the principle of proportionality. The 
CJEU has also reiterated that limitations to the free movement of persons must take into 
account the personal conduct of the individual concerned. Again, we can ask ourselves 
if it would not be better to guarantee the highest level of protection of fundamental 
                                                
104 See, among others, Sentencia 3/2017, de 17 de febrero de 2017, de la Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo 
Penal, Sección 2ª, and Sentencia 11/2017, de 17 de marzo de 2017, de la Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo 
Penal, Sección 1ª.  
105 See Sentencia 354/2015 de 17 de mayo de 2017, del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal, Sección 
Primera.  
106 F. de Londras, cit. supra., p. 245.  
107 B. Oliveira Martins, Social Appropriateness in the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy, in F. De 
Londras and J. Doody (eds.), The Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism, 
Routledge, 2015, p. 136.  
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rights during the legislative process and the ex ante reviews rather than relying solely on 
its non-annulment by the CJEU and on a non-contested application by national courts.   
To sum up, the criticism towards UNSC Resolution 2178, the Riga Protocol and the EU 
Directive on combating terrorism is focused on their ambiguity and sloppy drafting108. 
The Council of Europe and the European Union have made attempts to address these 
concerns by clarifying the element of the crimes, mostly in their preambles and 
explanatory reports. Unfortunately, as far as these international instruments are not 
challenged, national courts will have to find the right fit between individual rights and 
general interest in the case-by-case application of criminal measures. Indeed, they are 
the first ones to avoid these words from coming true: “the real threat to the life of the 
nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and 
political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these”109.  
 
                                                
108 Scheinin, cit. supra.  
109 Opinion of Lord Hoffmann of 16 December of 2004 for Judgment in the Cause A v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, p. 53.  
